积极出价会有回报吗?实证研究

Philipp Herrmann, Dennis Kundisch, M. Rahman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们实证研究了在网上拍卖中通过攻击性发出信号的收益。为了解决我们的研究问题,我们使用了一个独特且非常丰富的数据集,其中包含大约7000次按出价付费拍卖的实际市场交易数据。我们的研究设计使我们能够分离出积极出价的影响,这种出价试图发出高估值的信号,以阻止其他拍卖参与者,对拍卖获胜概率的影响。我们分析了大约2,600名不同的拍卖参与者手动放置的600,000多个投标。我们发现积极出价对出价总数和拍卖参与者总数有强烈而显著的积极影响。积极出价对个人赢得拍卖的概率的强烈而显著的负面影响支持了积极出价在在线拍卖中作为威慑竞争对手的策略无效的发现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does It Pay Off to Bid Aggressively? An Empirical Study
We empirically investigate the payoff of signaling through aggressiveness in an online auction. To address our research question, we use a unique and very rich dataset containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7,000 pay-per-bid auctions. Our research design allows us to isolate the impact of aggressive bidding, used in an attempt to signal a high valuation to deter other auction participants, on the probability of winning an auction. We analyze more than 600,000 bids placed manually by approximately 2,600 distinct auction participants. We find a strong and significant positive effect of aggressive bidding on the total number of bids placed, and on the total number of participants in an auction. The strong and significantly negative effect of aggressive bidding on the individual probability of winning an auction supports the finding that aggressive bidding is ineffective as a strategy for deterring competitors in an online auction.
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