The policy of the administration of the US President Richard M. Nixon on PRC (March-July 1969)

The article investigates the formation of the foreign policy course of US President Richard M. Nixon on China in March-July 1969. The practical implementation of pre-election initiatives by the administration of the President Richard M. Nixon in the Chinese direction in March-July 1969 was studied. There were analyzed reasons, course and consequences of intensification of Washington's foreign policy strategy towards Beijing during the during investigated period. The role of various groups in the American establishment in the process of forming the foreign policy course of the new administration towards China in March-July 1969 is outlined. It is described the specific US foreign policy actions towards communist China at the beginning of Richard M. Nixon presidential period. Despite the presence in the political, academic and social circles of the United States of certain attitudes in favor of the recognition of the People's Republic of China as the political reality of international life, the question of the legal recognition of China in the second half of the 1960’s constantly moved to the background. The victory of Richard М. Nixon in the presidential election in 1968 was accompanied by a series of changes in the system of geopolitical and military priorities of the United States. The new administration’s more realistic approach to China was due primarily to the fact that Beijing, which renounced its alliances and claimed the role of a «third force», was a strong player in the international arena. Moreover, the policy of Kennedy–Johnson did not justify itself, as China has intensified its foreign policy, established relations with many countries, including the US allies. At the beginning of the presidency of Richard М. Nixon in March-July 1969, his administration was managed to quickly develop and begin to implement a holistic concept of «new policy» for China. His Chinese policy was inextricably linked to the US foreign policy in Asia and reflected the clash of American and Chinese interests in the region. At the same time, the representatives of the American establishment have a clear idea of how they could influence Soviet-Chinese relations in order to deepen the rift between the USSR and China, and what concrete benefits they could derive from this. A number of objective and subjective factors not prevented the administration of the 37th President of the United States, Richard М. Nixon, radically changing Washington’s Chinese policy. Communist China continued to be recognized as a powerful factor in the US-Soviet dialogue. In spite of this, in the late 60’s of the twentieth century the objective preconditions began to evolve gradually, which promoted to the normalization of US-China relations in the future, and allowed to resolve most of the controversial issues that ultimately led to the international recognition of the People’s Republic of China by the United States of America.