The ‘Non-Whole’ of Hegelian Nature: Extrinsicality and the Problems of Sickness and Death

This chapter outlines the rejection that has followed Hegel’s philosophy of nature for the last two hundred years. It stresses how, when considered at all, Hegel’s writings on nature are read to be derived from Schelling’s innovations in nature-philosophy. The consequences have been dire for Hegel’s account of nature. Either (1) scholars downplay its relevance, or; (2) they read it in terms of a ‘strong’ correspondence between nature, on the one hand, and the movements of thought, on the other. Therefore, the chapter argues, we do not know what a distinctly Hegelian reading of Hegel’s position might look like, let alone offer. Fundamentally challenging these entrenched interpretations, the chapter underlines the repeated textual evidence that allows one to read Hegel’s philosophy of nature in exactly the opposite direction. Consequently, the chapter emphasizes passages throughout the entirety of the text characterizing nature as weak, impotent (Ohnmacht), and even irrational. The chapter thereby clears the space for a distinct reading of Hegelian nature: it is reticent to the systematic dictates of conceptuality and therefore lacks the encompassing necessity demanded by thought.