价格信息、村间网络和“议价溢出效应”:来自加纳的实验证据

Emilia Soldani, N. Hildebrandt, Yaw Nyarko, G. Romagnoli
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引用次数: 25

摘要

通过一项随机实验和农民之间通信的详细数据,我们确定了基于短信的商品价格信息对农民的影响。山药是一种贸易商和农民之间讨价还价非常普遍的作物,干预措施使治疗组农民的价格提高了9%,并使与治疗组有密切营销联系的对照组农民获得了可观的间接利益。由于这些控制农民无法获得价格信息,我们推测溢出效应可能是由议价溢出效应驱动的,并在一个正式模型中捕捉到这种直觉。干预对该地区种植的其他作物没有影响,这些作物具有不同的市场结构和较低的议价发生率。研究结果扩展了我们对使信息通信技术干预有效的市场结构特征的理解,并强调了考虑长期村间溢出效应的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Price Information, Inter-Village Networks, and 'Bargaining Spillovers': Experimental Evidence from Ghana
Through a randomized experiment and detailed data on communications among farmers, we identify the impact of text-messages-based commodity price information on rural farmers. For yam, a crop with high prevalence of bargaining between traders and farmers, the intervention leads to a 9% increase in the prices received by farmers in the treatment group and to substantial indirect benefits for control group farmers with strong marketing ties to the treated group. As these control farmers do not gain price information, we speculate that the spillovers might be driven by bargaining spillovers, and capture this intuition in a formal model. The intervention has no impact on other crops grown in the area, which are characterized by different market structure and lower incidence of bargaining. The results expand our understanding of the mar- ket structure characteristics that make ICT interventions effective and highlight the importance of accounting for longer-run inter-village spillover effects.
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