{"title":"情态完成与知觉的不纯","authors":"S. Overgaard","doi":"10.17454/pam-2210","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Defenders of The Pure View – “Purists”, as I shall call them – maintain that perception is pure presentation. That is, a perceptual experience has no commitments that exceed what is given or presented in the experience. I argue The Pure View seems unable to offer a convincing account of amodal completion. I distinguish three Purist strategies for addressing amodal completion, and suggest that none is very promising.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Amodal Completion and the Impurity of Perception\",\"authors\":\"S. Overgaard\",\"doi\":\"10.17454/pam-2210\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Defenders of The Pure View – “Purists”, as I shall call them – maintain that perception is pure presentation. That is, a perceptual experience has no commitments that exceed what is given or presented in the experience. I argue The Pure View seems unable to offer a convincing account of amodal completion. I distinguish three Purist strategies for addressing amodal completion, and suggest that none is very promising.\",\"PeriodicalId\":404019,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Phenomenology & Mind\",\"volume\":\"47 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Phenomenology & Mind\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2210\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Phenomenology & Mind","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2210","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Defenders of The Pure View – “Purists”, as I shall call them – maintain that perception is pure presentation. That is, a perceptual experience has no commitments that exceed what is given or presented in the experience. I argue The Pure View seems unable to offer a convincing account of amodal completion. I distinguish three Purist strategies for addressing amodal completion, and suggest that none is very promising.
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