Algorand的权益证明

N. Dimitri
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在过去的几年里,一些基于区块链的在线平台决定使用共识程序,而不是比特币最初采用的工作量证明(PoW)。另一个备受关注的替代协议是所谓的权益证明(PoS),与PoW共识不同,它不是基于解决耗能的加密谜题,而是基于用户拥有的货币单位数量。不同的平台采用了不同版本的PoS。在本文中,我们研究了受Algorand启发的PoS版本,它包含了许多特定的功能。实际上,要确认链中的新区块,Algorand引入了三个步骤:提议,选择和确认区块。每个步骤都是由随机选择的用户执行的,其中抽奖是基于PoS的。我们找到了个人货币需求的显式解决方案,在主要的简化假设下,用户只会因为她抽到的第一个角色而得到系统的奖励。我们通过考虑外生和内生货币供给来做到这一点。我们还讨论了系统的货币均衡,这是分析中的一个重要因素,因为经济的长期不均衡可能导致失望并诱使一些用户离开系统。我们的研究结果表明,如果用户的偏好是异质的,而不是同质的,那么平衡似乎更有可能发生。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Proof-of-Stake in Algorand
In the last few years, a number of blockchain-based online platforms decided to use consensus procedures other than Proof of Work (PoW), originally adopted by Bitcoin. An alternative protocol, which attracted much attention, is the so-called Proof-of-Stake (PoS), which unlike PoW consensus is not based on solving an energy-consuming cryptopuzzle, but rather on the amount of currency units owned by a user. Different platforms adopted alternative versions of PoS. In this article, we investigate a version of PoS inspired by Algorand, which embodies a number of specific features. Indeed, to confirm a new block in the chain Algorand introduces three steps: proposal, selection , and confirmation of a block. Each step is performed by randomly selected users, where draws are based on PoS. We find explicit solutions for individual money demand, under the main simplifying assumption that a user is rewarded by the system only for the first role that she's drawn for. We do so by considering both exogenous and endogenous money supply. We also discuss the monetary equilibrium of the system, an important element in the analysis because a long-lasting disequilibrium of the economy may cause disappointment and induce some users to leave the system. Our findings suggest that an equilibrium seems to be more likely to take place if users have heterogeneous, rather than homogeneous, preferences.
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