基于fpga的mpsoc的安全性增强:嵌入式linux系统的启动到运行时保护流

Pascal Cotret, Florian Devic, G. Gogniat, Benoît Badrignans, L. Torres
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引用次数: 7

摘要

如今,嵌入式系统变得越来越复杂:硬件/软件协同设计方法是一种在单芯片上创建此类系统的方法,该方法可以基于fpga(现场可编程门阵列)等可重构技术。在这样的系统中,数据交换是一个关键点,因为它们传递关键和机密信息,数据在几个硬件模块和软件层之间传输。在FPGA开发生命周期的情况下,OS(操作系统)/数据更新作为运行时通信可以通过不安全的链接完成:攻击者可以使用这种媒介使系统行为不正常(恶意注入)或检索比特流相关信息(窃听)。最近的工作提出了在运行时事务不受保护的情况下安全启动比特流和相关操作系统的解决方案。本文提出了嵌入式Linux内核在启动过程中完整的从启动到运行时保护流程,以及包含内核和主要应用程序代码/数据的外部内存的机密性/完整性保护。这项工作表明,这种带有硬件组件的解决方案的占用面积为xc6vlx240t Virtex-6 FPGA的10%,同时具有改进的Linux引导吞吐量和运行时保护的低延迟安全性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Security enhancements for FPGA-based MPSoCs: A boot-to-runtime protection flow for an embedded Linux-based system
Nowadays, embedded systems become more and more complex: the hardware/software codesign approach is a method to create such systems in a single chip which can be based on reconfigurable technologies such as FPGAs (Field-Programmable Gate Arrays). In such systems, data exchanges are a key point as they convey critical and confidential information and data are transmitted between several hardware modules and software layers. In case of an FPGA development life cycle, OS (Operating System) / data updates as runtime communications can be done through an insecure link: attackers can use this medium to make the system misbehave (malicious injection) or retrieve bitstream-related information (eavesdropping). Recent works propose solutions to securely boot a bitstream and the associated OS while runtime transactions are not protected. This work proposes a full boot-to-runtime protection flow of an embedded Linux kernel during boot and confidentiality/integrity protection of the external memory containing the kernel and the main application code/data. This work shows that such a solution with hardware components induces an area occupancy of 10% of a xc6vlx240t Virtex-6 FPGA while having an improved throughput for Linux booting and low-latency security for runtime protection.
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