被军事化伪装成外交政策的土耳其忧郁的经济指标

John Taskinsoy
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在atatatrk死后(1938年11月10日),土耳其军方认为自己是atatatrk的原则——世俗主义和民族团结——的无可置疑的唯一守护者。土耳其军队在20世纪50年代保护国家免受专制和反世俗政策的影响,在20世纪60年代和70年代极端无政府状态,以及在90年代以伊斯兰教为基础的反世俗意识形态政党的兴起。土耳其武装部队(TSK)在每次政变后都获得了一定的特权和特权,但军方在1980年的政变后起草的1982年宪法为军方在国内、外交和国防政策中施加权力创造了正式(体制)和非正式(非体制)的机制。2007年的事态发展标志着军民关系力量平衡转变的起点;尽管军方对正义与发展党反世俗的方式高度警惕,但4月27日午夜的电子备忘录(电子政变)未能阻止正义与发展党选择外交部长阿卜杜拉·格为2007年执政党总统候选人;但更重要的是,军方未能保护国家的政教分离秩序。当时的总理Erdoğan对包括四星将军在内的高级军官发动了一场法律战争,指控他们在2003年和2004年策划了针对正义与发展党政府的政变。军方也输掉了这场战斗,通过Ergenekon和Balyoz(大锤)调查和相关审判,许多高级军事人员被指控、逮捕和起诉,罪名是密谋推翻正义与发展党政府;这是土耳其历史上第一次,让所有人都难以置信的是,高级军官竟然在民事法庭上被民事检察官起诉。根据Erdoğan总统的新外交和国防政策,今天的土耳其不会退缩,展示其军事实力,即使这可能意味着激怒许多邻国和北约盟国。总统Erdoğan领导下的正义与发展党政府通过不懈的努力致力于削弱TSK的政治权力;在此过程中,Erdoğan政府充分利用了欧盟的哥本哈根标准(即文官控制军队是加入欧盟谈判的一个条件),剥夺了军队的正式和非正式机制。今天,军队服从于总统Erdoğan的意志,总统选择军事人员,向武装部队指挥官下达命令;此外,Erdoğan按照他的设想进行了一些结构改革,以重塑军队。由于土耳其坚持军费开支(2019年为204亿美元),可持续的经济复苏仍然是一个遥远的梦想。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Turkey’s Melancholy Economic Indicators Camouflaged by Militarization as a Foreign Policy
After Atatürk’s death (November 10, 1938), the Turkish military saw itself as the unquestioned sole guardian of Atatürk’s principles - secularism and national unity. The Turkish military protected the country against authoritarian and anti-secular policies in the 1950s, extreme anarchy in the 1960s and 1970s, and rise of Islamist-based political parties with anti-secular ideologies in the 1990s. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had gained certain prerogatives and privileges after each coup, but the 1982 Constitution drafted by the military ensuing the 1980 coup d'état created formal (institutional) and informal (non-institutional) mechanisms for the military to exert power in domestic, foreign, and defense policies. The developments in 2007 marked the starting point for a shift in balance of power in civil-military relations; in spite of the military’s high alert on the AKP’s anti-secular ways, the April 27 midnight e-memorandum (e-coup) failed to deter the AKP to select Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as the ruling party's candidate for the presidency in 2007; but more importantly, the military failed to protect the country’s laicistic – secularist order. Then Prime Minister Erdoğan waged a legal war against senior military officers including four-star generals for allegedly plotting a coup against the AKP government in 2003 and 2004. The military lost this battle too, through Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) investigations and related trials, many high-ranking military personnel had been accused, arrested, and prosecuted for plotting to overthrow the AKP government; and for the first time in Turkish history, and to everyone’s disbelief, senior military officers were actually prosecuted in civilian courts by civilian prosecutors. According to President Erdoğan’s new foreign and defense policies, today Turkey is not backing away showing its military muscle even this may mean irritating many of its neighbors and NATO allies. The AKP government under President Erdoğan’s leadership has devoted itself through relentless efforts to reduce the TSK’s political power; in the process, the Erdoğan administration has taken full advantage of the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria (i.e. civilian control of the military is a condition for EU accession negotiations) to strip of the military’s both formal and informal mechanisms. Today, the military is bent to President Erdoğan’s will, who selects military personnel and gives orders to commanders of the armed forces; additionally, Erdoğan has made a number of structural changes to reshape the military as he has envisaged. As Turkey insists spending on military ($20.4 billion in 2019), a sustainable economic recovery remains a distant dream.
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