‘Tools of Destabilization’: Kremlin’s Media Offensive in Lithuania

Just a few years ago Lithuania marked 20 years since the withdrawal of the Soviet army from its territory. On this occasion President Dalia Grybauskaitė stated that ‘speaking with one voice, Lithuania secured a historic victory without using arms. [...] This event is a history lesson on how much countries achieve when during a critical moment their citizens are united by principles one cannot violate, sell and betray’ (the Lithuanian Tribune 2013). This statement symbolises the fascination of the President with the political unity of that time and the non-military path towards Lithuanian independence, but on the other hand it illustrates the anxiety towards the lack of similar political mobilization in contemporary Lithuanian politics, and this true of Ukrainian, Moldavian or Georgian politics as well. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has lost direct political and military control of the region, but it started mastering the tools of non-military influence by exploiting the lingering weakness of post-Soviet societies: growing internal political splits, social and economic discontent, ethnic minorities, and prevailing energy and media dependencies. This new kind of Kremlin strategy paved the path for the Russian campaign in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Even before that, the new Russian strategy of ‘soft pressure’ became especially evident in the second half of 2013 when Lithuania took up the Presidency of the EU Council.