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Group-Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Job Matching with Continuous Transfers
We show that several classical results (the existence of a worker-optimal stable allocation, the rural hospitals theorem, the group-strategy-proofness of the worker-optimal stable mechanism) extend from the discrete to the continuous case in a generalized job matching model.
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