{"title":"W świecie wartości moralnych – między zawiłością a prostotą","authors":"Jakub Walicki","doi":"10.15584/slowo.2019.10.14","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the article I describe a dual nature of morality, arguing that moral actions require a constant movement between complexity and simplicity of the moral world. In the first part of the article I examine heterogeneity of the moral sphere, pointing out that it should not be simplified. I try to show why morality cannot be seen as a domain of perfect clarity and why it is usually impossible to make a firm distinction between goodness and evil. In the second part I argue that despite the difficulties, morality also requires self-confidence which can be justified. Although some moral problems are demanding, many others can be solved relatively easily. In the last part of the paper I discuss a difference between primary, spontaneous moral self-confidence, connected with simplified moral judgments, and secondary, reflective one, which comes from overcoming and controlling initial moral doubts.","PeriodicalId":162310,"journal":{"name":"Słowo. Studia językoznawcze","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Słowo. Studia językoznawcze","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15584/slowo.2019.10.14","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
W świecie wartości moralnych – między zawiłością a prostotą
In the article I describe a dual nature of morality, arguing that moral actions require a constant movement between complexity and simplicity of the moral world. In the first part of the article I examine heterogeneity of the moral sphere, pointing out that it should not be simplified. I try to show why morality cannot be seen as a domain of perfect clarity and why it is usually impossible to make a firm distinction between goodness and evil. In the second part I argue that despite the difficulties, morality also requires self-confidence which can be justified. Although some moral problems are demanding, many others can be solved relatively easily. In the last part of the paper I discuss a difference between primary, spontaneous moral self-confidence, connected with simplified moral judgments, and secondary, reflective one, which comes from overcoming and controlling initial moral doubts.