用于减轻缓存逻辑侧通道攻击的安全缓存备选地址表

Ameer Shalabi, Tara Ghasempouri, P. Ellervee, J. Raik
{"title":"用于减轻缓存逻辑侧通道攻击的安全缓存备选地址表","authors":"Ameer Shalabi, Tara Ghasempouri, P. Ellervee, J. Raik","doi":"10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Interest in memory systems’ security has increased during the last decade due to their vulnerabilities to be exploited by logical side channels attacks. A promising approach for attack detection at run-time is to monitor the cache memory’s behavior. However, designing an environment capable of detecting and mitigating these attacks is very challenging. In current monitoring systems, attack mitigation has been largely neglected. To overcome these shortcomings, in this work, we present a secure cache called SCAAT. SCAAT is equipped with an attack mitigation system to handle attacks by remapping where data is stored in the cache to random locations. In addition, SCAAT uses an attack monitor that identifies suspicious behavior that indicates cache logical side-channel attacks. The effectiveness of SCAAT is analyzed and evaluated for several cache configurations in terms of area overhead and performance.","PeriodicalId":128527,"journal":{"name":"2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"SCAAT: Secure Cache Alternative Address Table for mitigating cache logical side-channel attacks\",\"authors\":\"Ameer Shalabi, Tara Ghasempouri, P. Ellervee, J. Raik\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00043\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Interest in memory systems’ security has increased during the last decade due to their vulnerabilities to be exploited by logical side channels attacks. A promising approach for attack detection at run-time is to monitor the cache memory’s behavior. However, designing an environment capable of detecting and mitigating these attacks is very challenging. In current monitoring systems, attack mitigation has been largely neglected. To overcome these shortcomings, in this work, we present a secure cache called SCAAT. SCAAT is equipped with an attack mitigation system to handle attacks by remapping where data is stored in the cache to random locations. In addition, SCAAT uses an attack monitor that identifies suspicious behavior that indicates cache logical side-channel attacks. The effectiveness of SCAAT is analyzed and evaluated for several cache configurations in terms of area overhead and performance.\",\"PeriodicalId\":128527,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD)\",\"volume\":\"21 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00043\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00043","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

摘要

在过去的十年中,由于存储系统的漏洞容易被逻辑侧通道攻击所利用,人们对存储系统安全性的兴趣有所增加。在运行时检测攻击的一种很有前途的方法是监视缓存内存的行为。然而,设计一个能够检测和减轻这些攻击的环境是非常具有挑战性的。在目前的监测系统中,攻击缓解在很大程度上被忽视了。为了克服这些缺点,在这项工作中,我们提出了一种称为SCAAT的安全缓存。SCAAT配备了攻击缓解系统,通过将缓存中存储数据的位置重新映射到随机位置来处理攻击。此外,SCAAT使用一个攻击监视器来识别表明缓存逻辑侧通道攻击的可疑行为。从区域开销和性能方面分析和评估了几种缓存配置的SCAAT的有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
SCAAT: Secure Cache Alternative Address Table for mitigating cache logical side-channel attacks
Interest in memory systems’ security has increased during the last decade due to their vulnerabilities to be exploited by logical side channels attacks. A promising approach for attack detection at run-time is to monitor the cache memory’s behavior. However, designing an environment capable of detecting and mitigating these attacks is very challenging. In current monitoring systems, attack mitigation has been largely neglected. To overcome these shortcomings, in this work, we present a secure cache called SCAAT. SCAAT is equipped with an attack mitigation system to handle attacks by remapping where data is stored in the cache to random locations. In addition, SCAAT uses an attack monitor that identifies suspicious behavior that indicates cache logical side-channel attacks. The effectiveness of SCAAT is analyzed and evaluated for several cache configurations in terms of area overhead and performance.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信