{"title":"KEBIJAKAN INDONESIA MENOLAK MENGGUNAKAN MEKANISME AATHP JOINT EMERGENCY RESPONSE DALAM MENGATASI KEBAKARAN HUTAN DAN LAHAN 2015","authors":"Luerdi Luerdi","doi":"10.31219/osf.io/652jf","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to explain Indonesia’s rejection to resolve its 2015 forest and land fire disaster under the mechanism of Joint Emergency Response provided in the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. The haze caused by forest and land fires in Indonesia raised threats to not only itself but also states in the region of Southeast Asia. As it was declared as a regional problem, ASEAN then responded by creating a common framework called the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in 2002 and Indonesia was the last ratifying the agreement in 2014; more than a decade after its inception. Indonesia, however, refused to pick the AATHP Joint Emergency Response to tackle the 2015 disaster within its territory despite its most serious recurring disaster since 1997. This research applied the qualitative method with a causal correlation analysis. The research applied Charles O. Lerche and Abdul A. Said’s national interest theory. The research found that Indonesia’s rejection was driven by its national interests such as image, economy and politics which were much more important than others. Instead, Indonesia preferred the domestic efforts and bilateral cooperation to respond to it. The paper argues that the Southeast Asian regional institution is not able to offer incentives overtaking states’ domestic-oriented national interests.","PeriodicalId":318531,"journal":{"name":"Jurnal Ilmu Politik dan Komunikasi","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Jurnal Ilmu Politik dan Komunikasi","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/652jf","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本文旨在解释印度尼西亚拒绝在《东盟跨境雾霾污染协定》规定的联合应急机制下解决其2015年森林和土地火灾的原因。印度尼西亚的森林和土地火灾造成的雾霾不仅对自己造成了威胁,也对东南亚地区的国家造成了威胁。由于它被宣布为一个地区问题,东盟随后作出回应,于2002年建立了一个名为《东盟跨境雾霾污染协议》的共同框架,印尼是2014年最后一个批准该协议的国家;在成立十多年后。然而,印度尼西亚拒绝选择AATHP联合应急响应来应对其领土内的2015年灾难,尽管这是自1997年以来最严重的经常性灾害。本研究采用定性方法,并进行因果关系分析。本研究运用了Charles O. Lerche和Abdul A. Said的国家利益理论。研究发现,印尼的拒绝是由国家利益驱动的,比如形象、经济和政治,这些因素比其他因素重要得多。相反,印度尼西亚更愿意通过国内努力和双边合作来应对这一挑战。本文认为,东南亚区域性机构无法提供超越各国国内导向的国家利益的激励机制。
KEBIJAKAN INDONESIA MENOLAK MENGGUNAKAN MEKANISME AATHP JOINT EMERGENCY RESPONSE DALAM MENGATASI KEBAKARAN HUTAN DAN LAHAN 2015
This paper aims to explain Indonesia’s rejection to resolve its 2015 forest and land fire disaster under the mechanism of Joint Emergency Response provided in the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. The haze caused by forest and land fires in Indonesia raised threats to not only itself but also states in the region of Southeast Asia. As it was declared as a regional problem, ASEAN then responded by creating a common framework called the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in 2002 and Indonesia was the last ratifying the agreement in 2014; more than a decade after its inception. Indonesia, however, refused to pick the AATHP Joint Emergency Response to tackle the 2015 disaster within its territory despite its most serious recurring disaster since 1997. This research applied the qualitative method with a causal correlation analysis. The research applied Charles O. Lerche and Abdul A. Said’s national interest theory. The research found that Indonesia’s rejection was driven by its national interests such as image, economy and politics which were much more important than others. Instead, Indonesia preferred the domestic efforts and bilateral cooperation to respond to it. The paper argues that the Southeast Asian regional institution is not able to offer incentives overtaking states’ domestic-oriented national interests.