基于V2G的电动汽车充放电策略研究

Shihui Tian, Guowei Hua
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引用次数: 6

摘要

电动汽车的广泛应用将对电网产生一系列的影响。本文基于V2G技术,结合峰谷价格和出行习惯,讨论了充电和放电策略。提出了一种非合作主从博弈模型,其中电力公司决定放电价格,电动汽车车主决定充放电量。在这个博弈中,我们将电网的损耗纳入总成本,并且放电的数量受到剩余电量的限制。在博弈平衡点上,双方都将获得最大的利益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Charging and discharging strategies for electric vehicles based on V2G
The extensive application of electric vehicles will make a series influence on power gird. Based on V2G technology this paper discusses the charging and discharging strategies, combining the peak-valley price and the travel habit. We propose a non-cooperation master-slave game model, in which the power company decides discharging price, and the owner of electric vehicles decides the amount of charging and discharging. In this game, we incorporate the loss of power grid into the total cost, and the amount of discharging is limited by the surplus power. At the game equilibrium point, both of the participants will achieve the maximum benefits.
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