同等奖励与同等损失的破产问题

ERN: Equity Pub Date : 2017-02-17 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2919582
José Alcalde, Josep E. Peris
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引用次数: 5

摘要

有约束的同等奖励和同等损失原则是解决破产问题的传统方法。这些规则的特征是两个参数α和β,分别表示索赔人收到的最大金额,或索赔人损失的最大金额。此外,这些规则在代理集合中定义了一个分区:分配均等的代理和分配较低的代理(因为他们的最大奖励和最大损失不能超过他们的索赔)。我们通过使用测量相对冲突程度的特征τ来研究α和β之间的关系,以及它们在代理集中产生的相应分区。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Equal Awards vs. Equal Losses in Bankruptcy Problems
The Constrained Equal Awards and Equal Losses rules are traditional ways to solve bankruptcy problems. These rules are characterized by two parameters α and β that represent, respectively, the maximum amount a claimant receives, or the maximum amount a claimant loses. Moreover, these rules define a partition in the set of agents: those who are equally rationed, and those sustaining a lower rationing (because their maximal award and maximal loss cannot exceed their claim). We investigate the relationship between α and β, and the corresponding partitions they originate in the set of agents, by using a characteristic τ measuring the relative degree of conflict.
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