{"title":"考虑用户异质性的收费收入再分配效率与公平性","authors":"Shu-Xian Xu, Tian-Liang Liu, Haijun Huang","doi":"10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6874097","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"With the explicit consideration of user heterogeneity, i.e. each user has a different value of time (VOT), this paper examines system efficiency and social equity of redistribution of toll revenue in a bi-mode transportation service system. Three mode choice equilibrium models are built without road congesting pricing, with road congesting pricing and with the combination of road congesting pricing and transit subsidies, respectively. With mild assumptions, we prove that the number of highway users decreases and the total social cost of service system increases with subsidy share, respectively. Numerical analysis indicates that there exists an optimal subsidy share so as to minimize the social inequity measured by Gini coefficient. Furthermore, with the increase of user heterogeneity, the Gini coefficient is larger and the total travel cost is lower.","PeriodicalId":206364,"journal":{"name":"2014 11th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Efficiency and equity of redistribution of toll revenue with user heterogeneity\",\"authors\":\"Shu-Xian Xu, Tian-Liang Liu, Haijun Huang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6874097\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"With the explicit consideration of user heterogeneity, i.e. each user has a different value of time (VOT), this paper examines system efficiency and social equity of redistribution of toll revenue in a bi-mode transportation service system. Three mode choice equilibrium models are built without road congesting pricing, with road congesting pricing and with the combination of road congesting pricing and transit subsidies, respectively. With mild assumptions, we prove that the number of highway users decreases and the total social cost of service system increases with subsidy share, respectively. Numerical analysis indicates that there exists an optimal subsidy share so as to minimize the social inequity measured by Gini coefficient. Furthermore, with the increase of user heterogeneity, the Gini coefficient is larger and the total travel cost is lower.\",\"PeriodicalId\":206364,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2014 11th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM)\",\"volume\":\"13 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-06-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2014 11th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6874097\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2014 11th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6874097","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Efficiency and equity of redistribution of toll revenue with user heterogeneity
With the explicit consideration of user heterogeneity, i.e. each user has a different value of time (VOT), this paper examines system efficiency and social equity of redistribution of toll revenue in a bi-mode transportation service system. Three mode choice equilibrium models are built without road congesting pricing, with road congesting pricing and with the combination of road congesting pricing and transit subsidies, respectively. With mild assumptions, we prove that the number of highway users decreases and the total social cost of service system increases with subsidy share, respectively. Numerical analysis indicates that there exists an optimal subsidy share so as to minimize the social inequity measured by Gini coefficient. Furthermore, with the increase of user heterogeneity, the Gini coefficient is larger and the total travel cost is lower.