{"title":"加州ISO实时市场策略竞价的实证研究","authors":"Anjali Sheffrin","doi":"10.1109/PESS.2001.970098","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study builds on previous studies by the California Independent System Operator Corporation's Department of Market Analysis (\"DIVIA\") indicating that prices in the California electricity markets have persisted at high levels indicative of significant exercise of market power in the California wholesale energy markets. This particular study examines bids by individual suppliers (both instate and importers) in the real-time imbalance energy market of the ISO in order to determine whether individual suppliers' behaviors were responsible for raising prices above competitive levels. Resolving that issue affirmatively, it then explains how suppliers successfully employed bidding strategies to insure high market clearing prices. The evidence described in this study thus provides a direct link between the observed pattern of prices and the bidding behavior of individual suppliers that produced those prices.","PeriodicalId":273578,"journal":{"name":"2001 Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting. Conference Proceedings (Cat. No.01CH37262)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2001-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"32","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Empirical evidence of strategic bidding in California ISO real-time market\",\"authors\":\"Anjali Sheffrin\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/PESS.2001.970098\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study builds on previous studies by the California Independent System Operator Corporation's Department of Market Analysis (\\\"DIVIA\\\") indicating that prices in the California electricity markets have persisted at high levels indicative of significant exercise of market power in the California wholesale energy markets. This particular study examines bids by individual suppliers (both instate and importers) in the real-time imbalance energy market of the ISO in order to determine whether individual suppliers' behaviors were responsible for raising prices above competitive levels. Resolving that issue affirmatively, it then explains how suppliers successfully employed bidding strategies to insure high market clearing prices. The evidence described in this study thus provides a direct link between the observed pattern of prices and the bidding behavior of individual suppliers that produced those prices.\",\"PeriodicalId\":273578,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2001 Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting. Conference Proceedings (Cat. No.01CH37262)\",\"volume\":\"53 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2001-07-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"32\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2001 Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting. Conference Proceedings (Cat. No.01CH37262)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/PESS.2001.970098\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2001 Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting. Conference Proceedings (Cat. No.01CH37262)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/PESS.2001.970098","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Empirical evidence of strategic bidding in California ISO real-time market
This study builds on previous studies by the California Independent System Operator Corporation's Department of Market Analysis ("DIVIA") indicating that prices in the California electricity markets have persisted at high levels indicative of significant exercise of market power in the California wholesale energy markets. This particular study examines bids by individual suppliers (both instate and importers) in the real-time imbalance energy market of the ISO in order to determine whether individual suppliers' behaviors were responsible for raising prices above competitive levels. Resolving that issue affirmatively, it then explains how suppliers successfully employed bidding strategies to insure high market clearing prices. The evidence described in this study thus provides a direct link between the observed pattern of prices and the bidding behavior of individual suppliers that produced those prices.