产业动态和资本结构(非)承诺

Shiqi Chen, Hui Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们开发了一个没有股东对未来债务水平承诺的杠杆和行业动态的竞争均衡模型。股东决定债务调整以及生产、进入和退出决策,以应对企业特有的技术冲击。不承诺导致债务发行,这增加了债务融资的成本。因此,进入壁垒提高了,阻碍了市场的进入。同时,由此产生的更高的产出价格缓解了已经在该行业的企业的债务-股权冲突。更重要的是,不承诺增加了高杠杆公司的数量,重塑了公司空间的分布,提高了行业周转率和杠杆率。研究结果与实证分布特征一致,表明企业层面的债务-股权冲突可能对行业动态产生深远影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Industry Dynamics and Capital Structure (Non)Commitment
We develop a competitive equilibrium model of leverage and industry dynamics absent of equity holders’ commitment to future debt levels. Shareholders determine the debt adjustment together with production, entry and exit decisions in response to firm-specific technology shocks. Non-commitment gives rise to debt issuance, which increases the cost of debt financing. Consequently, the entry barrier is raised, hindering entries into the market. Meanwhile, the resultant higher output price alleviates debt-equity conflicts for firms already in the industry. More importantly, non-commitment increases the mass of high-leverage firms, reshaping the distribution of the firm universe and escalating industry turnover and leverage. The results are aligned with empirical distribution features, suggesting debt-equity conflicts at the firm level can have a profound influence on industry dynamics.
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