工业机器人勒索软件:Akerbeltz

V. Vilches, Lander Usategui San Juan, Unai Ayucar Carbajo, Rubén Campo, Xabier Sáez de Cámara, Oxel Urzelai, Nuria García, E. Gil-Uriarte
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引用次数: 11

摘要

我们还没有从其他科技行业的曙光中吸取网络安全的教训。在机器人领域,现有的不安全状况需要立即得到解决。一些制造商从缺乏普遍意识中获利,通过声称他们的不安全(开放)系统促进了系统集成,系统地忽视了他们的责任,无视他们(缺乏)行为所带来的安全、隐私和道德后果。为了提高人们的意识,并说明“机器人设计的不安全”,我们创造了Akerbeltz,这是已知的第一个工业机器人勒索软件实例。我们的恶意软件使用工业协作机器人的领先品牌Universal robots进行演示。我们描述了目标背后的基本原理,并讨论了攻击的一般流程,包括最初的网络入侵、横向移动和后来的控制阶段。我们敦促安全研究人员采取某种披露政策,迫使制造商迅速做出反应。我们反对通过模糊实现安全,并鼓励在漏洞报告陷入死胡同时发布类似的操作。现在需要采取行动,让机器人在未来不再出现零日漏洞。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Industrial robot ransomware: Akerbeltz
Cybersecurity lessons have not been learnt from the dawn of other technological industries. In robotics, the existing insecurity landscape needs to be addressed immediately. Several manufacturers profiting from the lack of general awareness are systematically ignoring their responsibilities by claiming their insecure (open) systems facilitate system integration, disregarding the safety, privacy and ethical consequences that their (lack of) actions have. In an attempt to raise awareness and illustrate the “insecurity by design in robotics” we have created Akerbeltz, the first known instance of industrial robot ransomware. Our malware is demonstrated using a leading brand for industrial collaborative robots, Universal Robots. We describe the rationale behind our target and discuss the general flow of the attack including the initial cyber-intrusion, lateral movement and later control phase. We urge security researchers to adopt some sort of disclosure policy that forces manufacturers to react promptly. We advocate against security by obscurity and encourage the release of similar actions once vulnerability reports fall into a dead-end. Actions are now to be taken to abide a future free of zero-days for robotics.
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