{"title":"自明事件与链接的价值","authors":"Jimmy Chan, Wenzhang Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3124195","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We propose a theory of linking in long-term relationships based on what information becomes self-evident in equilibrium at the end of a stage game. We obtain a tight bound on the average per-period efficiency loss that must be incurred to enforce a stage-game outcome throughout a T-period repeated game when T is large. Our results apply to all monitoring structures and strategy profiles. They encompass the inefficiency result in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), as well as the approximate-efficiency results in Compte (1998), Obara (2009), and Chan and Zhang (2016).","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Self-Evident Events and the Value of Linking\",\"authors\":\"Jimmy Chan, Wenzhang Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3124195\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We propose a theory of linking in long-term relationships based on what information becomes self-evident in equilibrium at the end of a stage game. We obtain a tight bound on the average per-period efficiency loss that must be incurred to enforce a stage-game outcome throughout a T-period repeated game when T is large. Our results apply to all monitoring structures and strategy profiles. They encompass the inefficiency result in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), as well as the approximate-efficiency results in Compte (1998), Obara (2009), and Chan and Zhang (2016).\",\"PeriodicalId\":393761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-02-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3124195\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3124195","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
我们提出了一种长期关系的联系理论,该理论基于在阶段博弈结束时,什么信息在均衡中变得不言自明。我们得到了在T期重复博弈中,当T较大时,为实现阶段博弈结果而必须发生的平均每周期效率损失的紧密边界。我们的结果适用于所有的监测结构和战略概况。它们包括Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce(1991)的无效率结果,以及Compte (1998), Obara(2009)和Chan and Zhang(2016)的近似效率结果。
We propose a theory of linking in long-term relationships based on what information becomes self-evident in equilibrium at the end of a stage game. We obtain a tight bound on the average per-period efficiency loss that must be incurred to enforce a stage-game outcome throughout a T-period repeated game when T is large. Our results apply to all monitoring structures and strategy profiles. They encompass the inefficiency result in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), as well as the approximate-efficiency results in Compte (1998), Obara (2009), and Chan and Zhang (2016).