亚当·斯密,竞争过程,和有缺陷的消费者福利标准

Warren S. Grimes
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摘要

苏格兰经济学家亚当•斯密(Adam Smith)在1776年写道,个人的集体买卖将导致社会资源的优先配置。这种洞见经久不衰,并成为竞争法培育和保护竞争过程这一目标的基础。这一目标在大西洋两岸都有着悠久的根基,但由于消费者福利标准的出现而偏离了方向,而消费者福利标准现在在竞争法分析中占有重要地位。消费者福利标准的狭隘焦点导致了混乱和错误的决定,不能充分保护竞争过程。我指出了在许多交易中谁是买方谁是卖方的混淆,并描述了为什么这种分类在任何情况下都与竞争法的适用无关。当竞争被扭曲时,保护这一进程和确保优先分配资源的中心目标就会受到破坏,而不管对消费者有什么影响。适当的福利标准与伤害发生的地点无关。该标准关注的是在分销链的任何层面上的反竞争行为,而不管这种反竞争效应是针对上游的卖方还是下游的买方。对称标准根植于大西洋两岸的竞争法裁决;它在理论上是合理的,与消费者福利标准相比,更容易解释和应用。它更容易尊重竞争的更广泛目标,包括促进进入、创新和企业家和消费者的选择。我评估了这种对称的福利标准如何适用于合并和典型的掠夺性或排他性行为。该标准为简化分析和更好地服务于竞争的辅助目标提供了希望。促进和保持效率、提高产出和维持低消费价格是竞争过程中受到高度重视的好处,但它们不是决定性的。必须继续把重点放在保持竞争进程这一中心目标上。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Adam Smith, the Competitive Process, and the Flawed Consumer Welfare Standard
Scottish economist Adam Smith wrote in 1776 that the collective buying and selling of individuals would result in the preferred allocation of society’s resources. That insight has endured and is the basis for the competition law goal of fostering and protecting the competitive process. That goal, with venerable roots on both sides of the Atlantic, has been sidetracked by emergence of the consumer welfare standard, which is now preeminent in competition law analysis. The narrow focus of the consumer welfare standard has led to confusion and misdirected decisions that do not adequately protect the competitive process. I point to confusion about who is the buyer and who is the seller in many transactions, and describe why that classification should, in any event, be irrelevant in applying competition law. When competition is distorted, the central goal of protecting the process and ensuring a preferred allocation of resources is undermined, regardless of the impact on the consumer. The proper welfare standard is unconcerned with where the harm occurs. The standard focuses on anticompetitive conduct at any level of the distribution chain and regardless of whether the anticompetitive effects are directed upstream at sellers or downstream at buyers. The symmetric standard is rooted in competition law decisions on both sides of the Atlantic; it is sound in theory and, compared to the consumer welfare standard, is easier to explain and apply. It more comfortably honors the broader goals of competition, including promoting entry, innovation, and choices for both entrepreneurs and consumers. I assess how this symmetric welfare standard would apply to mergers and classic predatory or exclusionary conduct. The standard offers hope of simplifying analysis and better serving ancillary goals of competition. Fostering and preserving efficiency, enhancing output, and maintaining low consumer prices are among the highly valued benefits of the competitive process, but they are not determinative. The focus must remain on the central goal of preserving the competitive process.
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