可持续的债务

G. Bloise, H. Polemarchakis, Yiannis Vailakis
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引用次数: 6

摘要

我们表明,债务在竞争均衡下是可持续的,仅基于偿还的声誉;也就是说,即使债权人没有抵押品或法律制裁。在不完全资产市场中,当利率不断低于经济增长率时,自我保险比借贷成本更高,而贷款的偿还是由于债务合同中风险分担优势丧失的隐性威胁而强制执行的。私人债务作为内部货币的一种形式可靠地流通,而且不被视为投机泡沫。在适当的贸易收益假设下,存在具有自我强制债务的竞争均衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Sustainable Debt
We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for repayment; that is, even without collateral or legal sanctions available to creditors. In an incomplete asset market, when the rate of interest falls recurrently below the rate of growth of the economy, self‐insurance is more costly than borrowing, and repayments on loans are enforced by the implicit threat of loss of the risk‐sharing advantages of debt contracts. Private debt credibly circulates as a form of inside money, and it is not valued as a speculative bubble. Competitive equilibria with self‐enforcing debt exist under a suitable hypothesis of gains from trade.
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