从价税在双边市场中的收入和福利优势

ERN: Income Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-09-15 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1498316

Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger, Guttorm Schjelderup

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引用次数: 37

摘要

公共经济学的一个基准结论是，如果对垄断企业征收从价税，而不是征收单位税，就有可能同时增加税收和福利。我们表明，这种收入和福利优势在双边市场中并不成立。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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On Revenue and Welfare Dominance of Ad Valorem Taxes in Two-Sided Markets

A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.

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ERN: Income Policy (Topic)

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