《下一次削减战略武器条约》的问题与困境

A. Arbatov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

收到28.02.2021。2021年1月底,美国和俄罗斯将《新削减战略武器条约》延长了5年。因此,这两个核超级大国有时间来制定后续条约,而不是在战略真空中,而是依靠有效的条约及其透明度和可预测性的体系。提倡废除军备限制谈判并以“战略稳定的一般哲学”的无定形多边讨论取而代之的人近年来一直非常活跃,他们暂时回避了,但可能不会太久。可预见的即将到来的谈判的困难将被解释为他们即将灭亡的证据,这可能变成一种自我实现的预言,并再次使对话陷入僵局。近几十年来,军事技术和新战略理念的发展改变了各方的战略关系。这是在政治关系恶化、军备控制谈判长期停顿和一些重要裁军条约被废除的背景下发生的。现在双方必须迎头赶上。我们已经可以预见到他们立场上的主要分歧。华盛顿正在强调两个超级大国的战略和战术核武器的深度削减。莫斯科提出了“安全方程式”的概念,这意味着限制进攻性和防御性武器——包括核武器和非核武器。将非常需要两国领导人表现出强烈的政治意愿和智慧,以及文职和军事专家的辛勤工作和专业精神,以便恢复军备控制,这种控制在历史上已证明是防止核战争的障碍,是动荡的世界政治的稳定器。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Problems and Dilemmas of the Next Start Treaty
Received 28.02.2021. In the end of January 2021, the New START Treaty was extended by five years by the United States and Russia. Thus, the two nuclear superpowers have time to work on the follow-on treaty not in a strategic vacuum, but relying on the valid treaty and its system of transparency and predictability. The promoters of abolishing negotiations on arms limitation and their substitution by amorphous multilateral discussions of “a general philosophy of strategic stability”, who have been highly active during recent years, have temporarily shied away, but probably not for long. The predictable difficulties of the forthcoming negotiations would be interpreted as the evidence of their impending doom, and this may turn into a self-fulfilling prophesy and once again deadlock the dialogue. During the previous decades, the development of the military technologies and new strategic concepts have changed strategic relationship of the parties. This was happening against the background of deteriorating political relations, a long pause of arms control negotiations and abrogation of a number of crucial disarmament treaties. Now the two sides have to catch up. Already it is possible to foresee the main differences of their positions. Washington is emphasizing deep reduction of the nuclear arms of the two superpowers – both strategic and tactical. Moscow has advanced a concept of “security equation”, which implies limitation of offensive and defensive arms – both nuclear and nonnuclear. There will be a great demand for strong political will and wisdom of the leaders of the two nations and of hard work and professionalism of civilian and military experts – in order to restore arms control, which has historically proved its effectiveness as a barrier in preventing nuclear war and as a stabilizer of turbulent world politics.
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