懒惰垄断与竞争组织:以圣彼得堡医疗保险制度为例

I. Baranov, T. Sklyar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了医疗机构在俄罗斯健康保险体系中的活动。赫希曼(A. Hirschman)提出了“退出”、“声音”和“忠诚”的概念来揭示医疗保健消费者的地位。本文在2003年、2005年和2007年进行的研究的基础上,证明了大多数公共卫生机构存在“懒惰垄断”的观点。在没有竞争的市场中,没有通过行使其“退出”权(在这种情况下是通过在强制医疗保险制度内更换医生或卫生服务提供者)或“发言权”来表达不满的消费者被鼓励去另一个市场-要么在公共机构支付服务费用,要么转向私营组织。结果,公立诊所没有赔钱,也没有动力去提高服务质量。本文分析了一些可以使卫生组织变得不那么“懒惰”的工具,如引入健康保险组织之间的竞争,提高医生的工资等。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Lazy Monopoly vs Competing Organization: A Case of St. Petersburg Health Insurance System
The paper analyzes the activity of medical organizations in Russian health insurance system. A conception of “exit”, “voice” and “loyalty” by A. Hirschman is used to reveal the position of health care consumers . On the basis of researches that have been conducted in 2003, 2005 and 2007 the paper proves the idea that the majority of public health care organizations presents “lazy monopoly”. In a market without competition, consumers who do not express their dissatisfaction by exercising their right of “exit” (in this case by changing doctor or provider of health services within compulsory medical insurance system) or of “voice” are encouraged to go to another market – either to pay for services at public institutions or to turn to private organizations. As a result, public clinics do not lose money and are not motivated to improve performance and quality. The paper includes analysis of some tools which could make health organizations to become less “lazy”, such as introduction of competition between health insurance organizations, increase of physicians salary, etc.
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