受托人年龄和代表性对战略性资产配置的影响

Rob Bauer, Rien Bogman, Matteo Bonetti, Dirk Broeders
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引用次数: 0

摘要

受托人委员会负有信托责任,以受益人的最佳利益投资养老基金的资产。受托人的特点不应影响其投资决策。我们发现公司养老基金有两个反事实的人工制品。首先,在控制养老基金的特点后,较高的董事会平均年龄使股票的战略配置降低了7个百分点。这种战略资产配置方式不能充分反映受益者的特点。其次,在董事会中拥有更多雇主代表的养老基金将更多资金配置在股票上。这就造成了雇主、受托人和受益人之间的委托代理问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Impact of Trustees' Age and Representation on Strategic Asset Allocations
A board of trustees has the fiduciary duty to invest a pension fund's assets in the best interest of its beneficiaries. Trustees' characteristics should not affect their investment decisions. We find two counterfactual artefacts for corporate pension funds. First, a higher average board age lowers the strategic allocation to equity by 7 percentage points after controlling for the pension fund's characteristics. This way the strategic asset allocation does not fully reflect the beneficiaries' characteristics. Second, pension funds with a greater representation of employers on the board allocate more to equities. This fosters a principal-agent problem between employer trustees and beneficiaries.
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