Rob Bauer, Rien Bogman, Matteo Bonetti, Dirk Broeders
{"title":"受托人年龄和代表性对战略性资产配置的影响","authors":"Rob Bauer, Rien Bogman, Matteo Bonetti, Dirk Broeders","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3743962","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A board of trustees has the fiduciary duty to invest a pension fund's assets in the best interest of its beneficiaries. Trustees' characteristics should not affect their investment decisions. We find two counterfactual artefacts for corporate pension funds. First, a higher average board age lowers the strategic allocation to equity by 7 percentage points after controlling for the pension fund's characteristics. This way the strategic asset allocation does not fully reflect the beneficiaries' characteristics. Second, pension funds with a greater representation of employers on the board allocate more to equities. This fosters a principal-agent problem between employer trustees and beneficiaries.","PeriodicalId":243344,"journal":{"name":"PsychRN: Leadership & Management (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Impact of Trustees' Age and Representation on Strategic Asset Allocations\",\"authors\":\"Rob Bauer, Rien Bogman, Matteo Bonetti, Dirk Broeders\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3743962\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A board of trustees has the fiduciary duty to invest a pension fund's assets in the best interest of its beneficiaries. Trustees' characteristics should not affect their investment decisions. We find two counterfactual artefacts for corporate pension funds. First, a higher average board age lowers the strategic allocation to equity by 7 percentage points after controlling for the pension fund's characteristics. This way the strategic asset allocation does not fully reflect the beneficiaries' characteristics. Second, pension funds with a greater representation of employers on the board allocate more to equities. This fosters a principal-agent problem between employer trustees and beneficiaries.\",\"PeriodicalId\":243344,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PsychRN: Leadership & Management (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PsychRN: Leadership & Management (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743962\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PsychRN: Leadership & Management (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743962","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Impact of Trustees' Age and Representation on Strategic Asset Allocations
A board of trustees has the fiduciary duty to invest a pension fund's assets in the best interest of its beneficiaries. Trustees' characteristics should not affect their investment decisions. We find two counterfactual artefacts for corporate pension funds. First, a higher average board age lowers the strategic allocation to equity by 7 percentage points after controlling for the pension fund's characteristics. This way the strategic asset allocation does not fully reflect the beneficiaries' characteristics. Second, pension funds with a greater representation of employers on the board allocate more to equities. This fosters a principal-agent problem between employer trustees and beneficiaries.