听到的旋律是甜美的,但听不到的旋律更甜美:用跨国公司层面的调查来理解腐败

Nathan M. Jensen, Quan Li, Aminur Rahman
{"title":"听到的旋律是甜美的,但听不到的旋律更甜美:用跨国公司层面的调查来理解腐败","authors":"Nathan M. Jensen, Quan Li, Aminur Rahman","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-4413","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Since the early 1990s, a large number of studies have been undertaken to understand the causes and consequences of corruption. Many of these studies have employed firm-level survey data from various countries. While insightful, these analyses based on firm-level surveys have largely ignored two important potential problems: nonresponse and false response by the firms. Treating firms'responses on a sensitive issue like corruption at their face value could produce incorrect inferences and erroneous policy recommendations. We argue that the data generation of nonresponse and false response is a function of the political environment in which the firms operate. In a politically repressive environment, firms use nonresponse and false response as self-protection mechanisms. Corruption is understated as a result. We test our arguments using the World Bank enterprise survey data of more than 44,000 firms in 72 countries for the period 2000-2005 and find that firms in countries with less press freedom are more likely to provide nonresponse or false response on the issue of corruption. Therefore, ignoring this systematic bias in firms'responses could result in underestimation of the severity of corruption in politically repressive countries. More important, this bias is a rich and underutilized source of information on the political constraints faced by the firms. Nonresponse and false response, like unheard melodies, could be more informative than the heard melodies in the available truthful responses in firm surveys.","PeriodicalId":425296,"journal":{"name":"World Bank: Infrastructure (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"15","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Heard Melodies are Sweet, but Those Unheard are Sweeter: Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys\",\"authors\":\"Nathan M. Jensen, Quan Li, Aminur Rahman\",\"doi\":\"10.1596/1813-9450-4413\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Since the early 1990s, a large number of studies have been undertaken to understand the causes and consequences of corruption. Many of these studies have employed firm-level survey data from various countries. While insightful, these analyses based on firm-level surveys have largely ignored two important potential problems: nonresponse and false response by the firms. Treating firms'responses on a sensitive issue like corruption at their face value could produce incorrect inferences and erroneous policy recommendations. We argue that the data generation of nonresponse and false response is a function of the political environment in which the firms operate. In a politically repressive environment, firms use nonresponse and false response as self-protection mechanisms. Corruption is understated as a result. We test our arguments using the World Bank enterprise survey data of more than 44,000 firms in 72 countries for the period 2000-2005 and find that firms in countries with less press freedom are more likely to provide nonresponse or false response on the issue of corruption. Therefore, ignoring this systematic bias in firms'responses could result in underestimation of the severity of corruption in politically repressive countries. More important, this bias is a rich and underutilized source of information on the political constraints faced by the firms. Nonresponse and false response, like unheard melodies, could be more informative than the heard melodies in the available truthful responses in firm surveys.\",\"PeriodicalId\":425296,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"World Bank: Infrastructure (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"72 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"15\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"World Bank: Infrastructure (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4413\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"World Bank: Infrastructure (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4413","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15

摘要

自1990年代初以来,已经进行了大量的研究,以了解腐败的原因和后果。这些研究中的许多都采用了来自不同国家的公司层面的调查数据。尽管这些基于公司层面调查的分析很有见地,但它们在很大程度上忽略了两个重要的潜在问题:公司的不回应和错误回应。从表面上看待企业对腐败等敏感问题的反应可能会产生不正确的推论和错误的政策建议。我们认为,无反应和错误反应的数据生成是企业经营所处的政治环境的函数。在政治压迫的环境中,企业使用不反应和虚假反应作为自我保护机制。因此,腐败被低估了。我们使用世界银行2000-2005年期间对72个国家的44,000多家公司的企业调查数据来验证我们的论点,发现新闻自由较少的国家的公司更有可能在腐败问题上提供不回应或虚假回应。因此,忽视企业反应中的这种系统性偏见可能会导致低估政治压制国家腐败的严重程度。更重要的是,这种偏见是关于企业所面临的政治限制的丰富而未得到充分利用的信息来源。在公司调查中,无反应和错误的反应,就像听不到的旋律一样,可能比听到的旋律更有信息量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Heard Melodies are Sweet, but Those Unheard are Sweeter: Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys
Since the early 1990s, a large number of studies have been undertaken to understand the causes and consequences of corruption. Many of these studies have employed firm-level survey data from various countries. While insightful, these analyses based on firm-level surveys have largely ignored two important potential problems: nonresponse and false response by the firms. Treating firms'responses on a sensitive issue like corruption at their face value could produce incorrect inferences and erroneous policy recommendations. We argue that the data generation of nonresponse and false response is a function of the political environment in which the firms operate. In a politically repressive environment, firms use nonresponse and false response as self-protection mechanisms. Corruption is understated as a result. We test our arguments using the World Bank enterprise survey data of more than 44,000 firms in 72 countries for the period 2000-2005 and find that firms in countries with less press freedom are more likely to provide nonresponse or false response on the issue of corruption. Therefore, ignoring this systematic bias in firms'responses could result in underestimation of the severity of corruption in politically repressive countries. More important, this bias is a rich and underutilized source of information on the political constraints faced by the firms. Nonresponse and false response, like unheard melodies, could be more informative than the heard melodies in the available truthful responses in firm surveys.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信