民主制度、互惠和亲社会行为

Luca Braghieri
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摘要

最近的实验研究表明,当管理战略互动的规则(如公共产品游戏)经过民主修改时,人们的行为会比外部修改时更合作。在一个相关的实验中,我表明,当临时分配是民主选择的时候,人们不太可能为了个人利益而单方面破坏盈余,而不是外部强加相同的临时分配。我还发展了一种互惠理论,可以使内生制度文献的主要发现合理化,包括本实验的发现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Democratic Institutions, Reciprocity, and Pro-Social Behavior
Recent experimental research suggests that people behave more cooperatively when the rules governing a strategic interaction (e.g. a public goods game) are modified democratically than when they are modified exogenously. In a related experiment, I show that people are less likely to unilaterally destroy surplus for personal gain when a provisional allocation is chosen democratically than when an identical provisional allocation is imposed exogenously. I also develop a theory of reciprocity that can rationalize the main findings of the endogenous institutions literature, including the ones from this experiment.
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