{"title":"行业诀窍?承销商发行前的价格操纵","authors":"J. Auh, You Suk Kim, Mattia Landoni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3132177","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study the trading of dealers around new bond issues underwritten by their affiliates using a complete matched record of U.S. bond market transactions, bond issue deals, and underwriter ownership structure from 2005 to 2015. Compared to dealers unaffiliated with the lead underwriter, affiliated dealers pay up to 54 basis points more for the issuer's preexisting bonds—prior to, during, and after the issuance event. We interpret this phenomenon as cross-security price support and, prior to the event, price maneuvers aimed at lowering the reference yield for new issue investors. By examining dealer inventories and profits, we find no support for alternative explanations such as hedging, informed trading, or competitive advantage in market-making.","PeriodicalId":254025,"journal":{"name":"SMU Cox School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Tricks of the Trade? Pre-Issuance Price Maneuvers by Underwriter-Dealers\",\"authors\":\"J. Auh, You Suk Kim, Mattia Landoni\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3132177\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study the trading of dealers around new bond issues underwritten by their affiliates using a complete matched record of U.S. bond market transactions, bond issue deals, and underwriter ownership structure from 2005 to 2015. Compared to dealers unaffiliated with the lead underwriter, affiliated dealers pay up to 54 basis points more for the issuer's preexisting bonds—prior to, during, and after the issuance event. We interpret this phenomenon as cross-security price support and, prior to the event, price maneuvers aimed at lowering the reference yield for new issue investors. By examining dealer inventories and profits, we find no support for alternative explanations such as hedging, informed trading, or competitive advantage in market-making.\",\"PeriodicalId\":254025,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"SMU Cox School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"17 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-07-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"SMU Cox School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3132177\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"SMU Cox School of Business Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3132177","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Tricks of the Trade? Pre-Issuance Price Maneuvers by Underwriter-Dealers
We study the trading of dealers around new bond issues underwritten by their affiliates using a complete matched record of U.S. bond market transactions, bond issue deals, and underwriter ownership structure from 2005 to 2015. Compared to dealers unaffiliated with the lead underwriter, affiliated dealers pay up to 54 basis points more for the issuer's preexisting bonds—prior to, during, and after the issuance event. We interpret this phenomenon as cross-security price support and, prior to the event, price maneuvers aimed at lowering the reference yield for new issue investors. By examining dealer inventories and profits, we find no support for alternative explanations such as hedging, informed trading, or competitive advantage in market-making.
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