员工资助递延薪酬如何促进共同利益,控制公司不当行为和错误的商业决策

Hamid Mehran
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摘要

在这篇文章中,我认为员工资助的递延薪酬可以减轻组织中的不当行为。其目标是在合理的情况下将部分罚款和和解费用内部化。因为员工可能需要承担一些强加给公司的成本,他们可能会参与信息生产及其在组织中的升级,以提醒其他人潜在的错误业务决策。因此,延期支付可以改善公司的内部治理,降低不当行为对公司利益相关者(包括公众)的潜在成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Employee-Funded Deferred Pay Can Promote Shared Interest, Control Corporate Misconduct and Faulty Business Decisions
In this essay, I argue that employee-funded deferred pay can mitigate misconduct in organizations. Its objective is to internalize some of the fines and settlement costs if justified. Because employees might be required to cover some of the costs imposed on a firm, they may engage in information production and its escalation in the organization to alert others about potentially faulty business decisions. Thus, deferred pay could improve internal governance of the firm and potential cost of misconduct on firm stakeholders, including the public.
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