{"title":"密钥同态PKE的安全性:防止密钥恢复攻击和密文有效性攻击","authors":"K. Emura","doi":"10.1587/transfun.2020eal2039","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Theoretically, an adversary sends a homomorphically evaluated challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle, and can immediately break the security. One may think that this is just a theoretical result and there is no practical impact. Even thoughBleichenbacher’sCCAattack [2] has beenwidely recognized, it is also widely recognized that a weaker security level is acceptable in return for obtaining a homomorphic property. However, several CCA attacks against concrete homomorphic encryption schemes have been also shown. We introduce key recovery attacks (KRA) as follows.","PeriodicalId":348826,"journal":{"name":"IEICE Trans. Fundam. Electron. Commun. Comput. Sci.","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the Security of Keyed-Homomorphic PKE: Preventing Key Recovery Attacks and Ciphertext Validity Attacks\",\"authors\":\"K. Emura\",\"doi\":\"10.1587/transfun.2020eal2039\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Theoretically, an adversary sends a homomorphically evaluated challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle, and can immediately break the security. One may think that this is just a theoretical result and there is no practical impact. Even thoughBleichenbacher’sCCAattack [2] has beenwidely recognized, it is also widely recognized that a weaker security level is acceptable in return for obtaining a homomorphic property. However, several CCA attacks against concrete homomorphic encryption schemes have been also shown. We introduce key recovery attacks (KRA) as follows.\",\"PeriodicalId\":348826,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEICE Trans. Fundam. Electron. Commun. Comput. Sci.\",\"volume\":\"38 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEICE Trans. Fundam. Electron. Commun. Comput. Sci.\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1587/transfun.2020eal2039\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEICE Trans. Fundam. Electron. Commun. Comput. Sci.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1587/transfun.2020eal2039","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
On the Security of Keyed-Homomorphic PKE: Preventing Key Recovery Attacks and Ciphertext Validity Attacks
Theoretically, an adversary sends a homomorphically evaluated challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle, and can immediately break the security. One may think that this is just a theoretical result and there is no practical impact. Even thoughBleichenbacher’sCCAattack [2] has beenwidely recognized, it is also widely recognized that a weaker security level is acceptable in return for obtaining a homomorphic property. However, several CCA attacks against concrete homomorphic encryption schemes have been also shown. We introduce key recovery attacks (KRA) as follows.