简单本体论,二维,和真理制造

R. Cameron
{"title":"简单本体论,二维,和真理制造","authors":"R. Cameron","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780192893314.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Amie Thomasson argues that ontology is easy. That there are tables (e.g.) is settled by a mixture of conceptual analysis—to discover under what conditions the concept ‘table’ is appropriately deployed—and straightforward empirical observation—looking in my kitchen to see that those conditions are met. There is, then, no distinctively metaphysical work to be done in settling whether there are tables, according to Thomasson. This paper agrees with Thomasson that it is easy to establish that tables exist and gives a two-dimensionalist defense of this claim. However, it argues that a distinctively metaphysical question remains: what must the world be like to make it the case that tables exist? It defends this view against objections from Thomasson, and draws out some morals concerning the project of ontology.","PeriodicalId":194543,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Easy Ontology, Two-Dimensionalism, and Truthmaking\",\"authors\":\"R. Cameron\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/OSO/9780192893314.003.0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Amie Thomasson argues that ontology is easy. That there are tables (e.g.) is settled by a mixture of conceptual analysis—to discover under what conditions the concept ‘table’ is appropriately deployed—and straightforward empirical observation—looking in my kitchen to see that those conditions are met. There is, then, no distinctively metaphysical work to be done in settling whether there are tables, according to Thomasson. This paper agrees with Thomasson that it is easy to establish that tables exist and gives a two-dimensionalist defense of this claim. However, it argues that a distinctively metaphysical question remains: what must the world be like to make it the case that tables exist? It defends this view against objections from Thomasson, and draws out some morals concerning the project of ontology.\",\"PeriodicalId\":194543,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780192893314.003.0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780192893314.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

艾米·托马森认为本体论很简单。例如,桌子的存在是通过概念分析和直接的经验观察来解决的,概念分析是为了发现在什么条件下“桌子”这个概念是合适的,而经验观察是为了观察我的厨房是否满足这些条件。因此,根据托马森的观点,在确定是否有表的问题上,不需要做特别的形而上学的工作。本文同意托马森的观点,即表的存在是很容易确立的,并对这一主张给出了二维的辩护。然而,它认为,一个独特的形而上学问题仍然存在:世界必须是什么样的,使它的情况下,表的存在?它反驳了托马森的反对意见,并提出了一些关于本体论计划的道德。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Easy Ontology, Two-Dimensionalism, and Truthmaking
Amie Thomasson argues that ontology is easy. That there are tables (e.g.) is settled by a mixture of conceptual analysis—to discover under what conditions the concept ‘table’ is appropriately deployed—and straightforward empirical observation—looking in my kitchen to see that those conditions are met. There is, then, no distinctively metaphysical work to be done in settling whether there are tables, according to Thomasson. This paper agrees with Thomasson that it is easy to establish that tables exist and gives a two-dimensionalist defense of this claim. However, it argues that a distinctively metaphysical question remains: what must the world be like to make it the case that tables exist? It defends this view against objections from Thomasson, and draws out some morals concerning the project of ontology.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信