{"title":"简单本体论,二维,和真理制造","authors":"R. Cameron","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780192893314.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Amie Thomasson argues that ontology is easy. That there are tables (e.g.) is settled by a mixture of conceptual analysis—to discover under what conditions the concept ‘table’ is appropriately deployed—and straightforward empirical observation—looking in my kitchen to see that those conditions are met. There is, then, no distinctively metaphysical work to be done in settling whether there are tables, according to Thomasson. This paper agrees with Thomasson that it is easy to establish that tables exist and gives a two-dimensionalist defense of this claim. However, it argues that a distinctively metaphysical question remains: what must the world be like to make it the case that tables exist? It defends this view against objections from Thomasson, and draws out some morals concerning the project of ontology.","PeriodicalId":194543,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Easy Ontology, Two-Dimensionalism, and Truthmaking\",\"authors\":\"R. Cameron\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/OSO/9780192893314.003.0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Amie Thomasson argues that ontology is easy. That there are tables (e.g.) is settled by a mixture of conceptual analysis—to discover under what conditions the concept ‘table’ is appropriately deployed—and straightforward empirical observation—looking in my kitchen to see that those conditions are met. There is, then, no distinctively metaphysical work to be done in settling whether there are tables, according to Thomasson. This paper agrees with Thomasson that it is easy to establish that tables exist and gives a two-dimensionalist defense of this claim. However, it argues that a distinctively metaphysical question remains: what must the world be like to make it the case that tables exist? It defends this view against objections from Thomasson, and draws out some morals concerning the project of ontology.\",\"PeriodicalId\":194543,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780192893314.003.0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780192893314.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Easy Ontology, Two-Dimensionalism, and Truthmaking
Amie Thomasson argues that ontology is easy. That there are tables (e.g.) is settled by a mixture of conceptual analysis—to discover under what conditions the concept ‘table’ is appropriately deployed—and straightforward empirical observation—looking in my kitchen to see that those conditions are met. There is, then, no distinctively metaphysical work to be done in settling whether there are tables, according to Thomasson. This paper agrees with Thomasson that it is easy to establish that tables exist and gives a two-dimensionalist defense of this claim. However, it argues that a distinctively metaphysical question remains: what must the world be like to make it the case that tables exist? It defends this view against objections from Thomasson, and draws out some morals concerning the project of ontology.