寡头消失:防御性所有权、财产权和政治关系

John S. Earle, Solomiya Shpak, Anton Shirikov, Scott Gehlbach
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们研究了代理人、空壳公司和离岸公司的使用,以保护财产免受私人和国家行为者的扣押。我们的理论框架强调政治关系在防御性所有权中的作用。将调查记者提供的关于众多乌克兰寡头主要持股的信息与公司层面的正式所有权关系的行政数据联系起来,我们观察到,在超过三分之二的寡头控制的公司中,存在某种形式的防御性所有权,但这种行为在与现任政权有联系的公司中要少见得多。进一步利用橙色革命(Orange Revolution)对政治关系的突然冲击,我们发现,在之前有关系的寡头中,防御性所有权急剧上升。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Oligarch Vanishes: Defensive Ownership, Property Rights, and Political Connections
We examine the use of proxies, shell companies, and offshore firms to defend property against seizure by private and state actors. Our theoretical framework emphasizes the role of political connections in defensive ownership. Linking information from investigative journalists on the key holdings of numerous Ukrainian oligarchs with firm-level administrative data on formal ownership ties, we observe some form of defensive ownership among more than two-thirds of oligarch-controlled firms, but such conduct is much less common for those connected to the incumbent regime. Further exploiting the abrupt shock to political connections that accompanied the Orange Revolution, we find a sharp rise in defensive ownership among previously connected oligarchs.
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