公司治理-绩效难题:新见解

A. Dumitrescu, Mohammed Zakriya
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文利用样本公司反收购条款发生率的最新数据(2007年至2015年),对治理-绩效关系提供了新的见解。除了相关文献中用于构建g指数、e指数和Gov-Score的等加权方法之外,我们提出了一种替代的非等加权“新治理(nG)指数”作为治理代理。我们表明,我们提出的ng指数比等加权衡量更持久地追踪治理-绩效关系。在我们的样本期内,治理结构更好的公司表现出更高的公司价值和更好的经营绩效。我们的分析进一步表明,零投资对冲做多治理差的股票组合,做空治理好的股票组合,将产生每月超过1.33%或每年约16%的异常回报。这种对冲与先前文献中提出的“做多良好治理-做空糟糕治理”策略完全相反。我们认为,这种对冲逆转表明,近年来,投资者寻求补偿与治理不善的公司相关的高风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Corporate Governance - Performance Puzzle: New Insights
This paper provides newer insights on governance – performance relationship using recent data (2007 to 2015) on anti-takeover provisions' incidence in the sample firms. Looking beyond the equally weighted methodology employed in related literature for constructing G-Index, E-Index, and Gov-Score, we present an alternate unequally weighted "new Governance (nG) Index" as governance proxy. We show that our proposed nG-Index traces governance – performance relationship more persistently than the equal-weighted measure. Firms with better governance structures are found to show higher firm values and superior operating performances in our sample period. Our analysis further reveals that a zero-investment hedge going long on poor governance stock portfolio and shorting the good governance one would have generated an abnormal return of over 1.33% per month or about 16% per year. This hedge is completely opposite to the long good governance – short poor governance strategy suggested in prior literature. We posit that such hedge reversal is an indication that, in recent years, investors seek compensation for high riskiness associated with poorly governed firms.
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