欧元如何收缩民主:希腊危机的启示

A. Lanzavecchia, Eugenio Pavarani, G. Tagliavini
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在欧洲采用单一货币纯粹是一个政治项目。我们从希腊危机中学到的是,加入欧元区意味着,如果政府越界,债权人可以摧毁一个国家的经济,夺取公共资产。为了让欧洲一体化存续下去,我们在此呼吁对主权债务进行根本性改革:从政策受限的目标转变为服务于政策目标的工具。在一个陷入困境的国家,贷款人有权迫使借款人接受并采取限制性的支出政策,以牺牲公民的利益为代价来捍卫自己的利益。最终,这将不可避免地导致借款人在财政政策、支出政策和公共财产决策方面丧失自主权。如果这种退化过程的原因是主权债务的特权,那么我们需要找到一个新的框架,将公共债务重新分类为人类发展的功能,而不是个人利益。一个国家不得偿还超出其偿还能力的债务。最高偿还能力应在授信前结算,作为其原始余额的一部分。因此,未质押偿还债务的基本余额应始终供政府用于投资、社会或安全支出以及应对突发事件。如果这条规则得以实施,资本市场将自动受到监管:超过这一门槛的债务将被自动注销。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Euro Shrinks Democracy: Insights from the Greek Crisis
The adoption of a single currency in Europe is a pure political project. What we have learned from Greek crisis is that being in the Eurozone means that creditors can destroy a national economy and seize public assets if the government steps out of line. To keep the European project alive, we here call for a fundamental reform on sovereign debt: switching from a goal to which policy is constrained, back to a tool to serve policy aims. In a distressed country, lenders has the power to forces the borrower to accept and to adopt restrictive spending policies that defend their interest at the expense of citizen’s ones. Eventually, this leads inevitably to the loss of autonomy in borrower’s decisions on fiscal policy, spending policy, public properties. If the cause for this degenerative process is the privilege on sovereign debt, then we need to find a new framework that reclassifies the public debt as functional to human development rather than individual profits. A country shall not be allowed to repay a debt that goes beyond its repayment capacity. The maximum payback capacity shall be settled before the credit is granted as a fraction of its primary balance. As such, the amount of primary balance not pledged to the repayment of the debt shall be always available to the government to undertake investments, social or security expenses and to face unexpected events. If this rule were implemented, the capital market would be automatically regulated: the debt that exceeds that threshold would be automatically written-off.
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