{"title":"1992年至2019年公司危机期间管理层权力和CEO薪酬动态的证据","authors":"Chin Tae Zan","doi":"10.53384/inbe.101350943.2779.1862003510","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the dynamics of two governance constructs, management influence over the board of directors and CEO remuneration, in enterprises in crisis from 1992 to 2019. Data reveal a strong trend of improving governance over time, which confounds the conclusion concerning the impact of distress on governance. Using a bias-corrected matching estimator to control for secular trends, we find that distressed businesses cut management board appointments and CEO compensation, deepen managerial incentive alignment, and increase CEO turnover. The performance-related component of CEO remuneration accounts for the majority of changes in CEO compensation in troubled businesses, which is consistent with the \"shareholder value\" perspective on CEO compensation.","PeriodicalId":408151,"journal":{"name":"Industrielle Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management","volume":"192 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evidence from 1992 to 2019 on the dynamics of managerial authority and CEO remuneration during company crises\",\"authors\":\"Chin Tae Zan\",\"doi\":\"10.53384/inbe.101350943.2779.1862003510\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We investigate the dynamics of two governance constructs, management influence over the board of directors and CEO remuneration, in enterprises in crisis from 1992 to 2019. Data reveal a strong trend of improving governance over time, which confounds the conclusion concerning the impact of distress on governance. Using a bias-corrected matching estimator to control for secular trends, we find that distressed businesses cut management board appointments and CEO compensation, deepen managerial incentive alignment, and increase CEO turnover. The performance-related component of CEO remuneration accounts for the majority of changes in CEO compensation in troubled businesses, which is consistent with the \\\"shareholder value\\\" perspective on CEO compensation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":408151,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Industrielle Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management\",\"volume\":\"192 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Industrielle Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.53384/inbe.101350943.2779.1862003510\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Industrielle Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.53384/inbe.101350943.2779.1862003510","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Evidence from 1992 to 2019 on the dynamics of managerial authority and CEO remuneration during company crises
We investigate the dynamics of two governance constructs, management influence over the board of directors and CEO remuneration, in enterprises in crisis from 1992 to 2019. Data reveal a strong trend of improving governance over time, which confounds the conclusion concerning the impact of distress on governance. Using a bias-corrected matching estimator to control for secular trends, we find that distressed businesses cut management board appointments and CEO compensation, deepen managerial incentive alignment, and increase CEO turnover. The performance-related component of CEO remuneration accounts for the majority of changes in CEO compensation in troubled businesses, which is consistent with the "shareholder value" perspective on CEO compensation.
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