{"title":"解释柏拉图、欧里庇得斯和塞内加的恶","authors":"Rachana Kamtekar","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780199915453.003.0007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Plato distinguishes two kinds of explanation: rational explanation of an agent’s practical reasoning leading to the selection of an action as a reasonable means to a good end, and dispositional explanation, given in terms of the agency that is such as to bring about an action of a given sort. Rational explanation seeks completion in the explainer’s recognition of the agent’s end as a good and the agent’s means as reasonable, which confers intelligibility on the action; dispositional explanation is a fallback when the explainer cannot see the agent’s end as good or means as reasonable—as is the case with evil. This claim is illustrated in Euripides’s and Seneca’s Medea plays.","PeriodicalId":318625,"journal":{"name":"Evil","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Explaining Evil in Plato, Euripides, and Seneca\",\"authors\":\"Rachana Kamtekar\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/OSO/9780199915453.003.0007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Plato distinguishes two kinds of explanation: rational explanation of an agent’s practical reasoning leading to the selection of an action as a reasonable means to a good end, and dispositional explanation, given in terms of the agency that is such as to bring about an action of a given sort. Rational explanation seeks completion in the explainer’s recognition of the agent’s end as a good and the agent’s means as reasonable, which confers intelligibility on the action; dispositional explanation is a fallback when the explainer cannot see the agent’s end as good or means as reasonable—as is the case with evil. This claim is illustrated in Euripides’s and Seneca’s Medea plays.\",\"PeriodicalId\":318625,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Evil\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-06-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Evil\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780199915453.003.0007\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Evil","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780199915453.003.0007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Plato distinguishes two kinds of explanation: rational explanation of an agent’s practical reasoning leading to the selection of an action as a reasonable means to a good end, and dispositional explanation, given in terms of the agency that is such as to bring about an action of a given sort. Rational explanation seeks completion in the explainer’s recognition of the agent’s end as a good and the agent’s means as reasonable, which confers intelligibility on the action; dispositional explanation is a fallback when the explainer cannot see the agent’s end as good or means as reasonable—as is the case with evil. This claim is illustrated in Euripides’s and Seneca’s Medea plays.