智利对高风险考试的反应:学校是提高了学习水平还是仅仅提高了考试成绩?

Á. Hofflinger, P. V. von Hippel
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引用次数: 9

摘要

高风险考试的问责制迫使学校提高考试成绩。然而,学校是通过“学术策略”(如更好的教学)还是通过“非学术策略”(如让表现不佳的学生“错过”高风险的考试)来提高分数,这往往是不清楚的。在评估智利高风险问责制项目的效果时,我们发现学校的缺课学生比例增加了一倍,缺课分数的增加主要集中在成绩较低的学生身上。考试成绩的缺失将问责制对低收入学生的明显影响夸大了50%,并让多达五分之一的低分数学校逃避了对低分数的问责。我们发现有限的证据表明教师改变了他们的学术实践,比如向学生提供更多的反馈。该计划的大部分影响仍未得到解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Response to High-Stakes Testing in Chile: Did Schools Improve Learning or Merely Inflate Test Scores?
Accountability for high-stakes tests pressures schools to improve test scores. Yet it is often unclear whether schools improve scores through “academic strategies” such as better instruction, or through “non-academic strategies” such as having low-performing students “miss” high-stakes tests. Evaluating the effects of a Chilean high-stakes accountability program, we find that schools doubled the percentage of students who missed the tests, and that the increase in missing test scores was concentrated among students with low grades. Missing test scores exaggerated by 50% the apparent effect of accountability on low-income students, and allowed up to one-fifth of low-scoring schools to avoid accountability for low scores. We find limited evidence that teachers changed their academic practices, such as providing more feedback to students. Much of the program’s effect remains unexplained.
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