美国总统肯尼迪对中华人民共和国外交政策路线的形成(1961年1月至10月)

A. Goncharenko
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考察了1961年1 - 10月美国总统肯尼迪对华外交政策路线的形成。美国民主党总统候选人肯尼迪就中国问题发表了有特色的竞选声明。研究了1961年1月至10月肯尼迪总统政府在中国方向上实际执行选举前倡议的情况。分析了调查期间美国对华外交政策战略强化的原因、过程和后果。概述了1961年1月至10月美国新一届政府对华外交政策方针形成过程中,美国建制派各派别的作用。描述了肯尼迪总统任期初期美国对共产主义中国的具体外交政策行动。肯尼迪在1960年总统选举中的胜利伴随着美国地缘政治和军事优先次序体系的一系列变化。新政府对中国采取更为现实的态度,主要是由于这样一个事实:北京方面放弃了与盟友的关系,并宣称要扮演“第三势力”的角色,但在国际舞台上是一个弱势角色,因此,对传统的“遏制和孤立”政策的微小偏离似乎是可以接受的。此外,“孤立”政策并没有为自己辩护,因为中国加强了外交政策,与包括美国盟友在内的许多国家建立了关系。渐渐地,支持中国在联合国获得席位的国家越来越多,这为共产主义中国获得广泛承认创造了真正的前景。1961年1月至10月,肯尼迪总统上任之初,他的政府无法迅速发展并开始实施中国“新边疆”的整体概念。他的中国政策与美国在亚洲的外交政策密不可分,反映了美国和中国在该地区利益的冲突。与此同时,美国建制派的代表并不清楚他们如何影响苏中关系,以加深苏中之间的裂痕,也不清楚他们可以从中获得什么具体利益。这是由许多原因造成的。首先,当他当选时,肯尼迪政府参与了当时美国军事和政治利益比对华政策更重要的事件(欧洲问题、大西洋统一问题、柏林危机)。其次,华盛顿仍然将共产主义中国视为威胁美国在亚洲利益的国家,并渴望扩大其影响力并加强其军事力量。肯尼迪政府外交政策路线形成的一个重要影响是,在他担任总统之初,他以最小的优势赢得了选举,但他没有冒险开始对中国政策的重大改变,没有放弃“遏制”政策。通过这种方式,这位美国第35任总统起初试图表明他尊重国内对共产主义中国持负面看法的公众舆论。其次,通过展示他对政治遗传的倾向,他希望加强他脆弱的外交政策地位。这就是为什么不排除改变美国对华政策可能性的肯尼迪,在他当时对中国的实际行动中,没有理由放弃“遏制”主义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Formation of the foreign policy course of US president J.F. Kennedy on the Peoples Republic of China (january-october 1961)
The article investigates the formation of the foreign policy course of US President John F. Kennedy on China in January-October 1961. There were characterized the election statements of the US presidential candidate from the Democratic Party J.F. Kennedy on China. The practical implementation of pre-election initiatives by the administration of the President John F. Kennedy in the Chinese direction in January-October 1961 was studied. There were analyzed reasons, course and consequences of intensification of Washington’s foreign policy strategy towards Beijing during the during investigated period. The role of various groups in the American establishment in the process of forming the foreign policy course of the new administration towards China in January-October 1961 is outlined. It is described the specific US foreign policy actions towards communist China at the beginning of J.F. Kennedy presidential period. The victory of J.F. Kennedy in the presidential election in 1960 was accompanied by a series of changes in the system of geopolitical and military priorities of the United States. The new administration’s more realistic approach to China was due primarily to the fact that Beijing, which renounced its alliances and claimed the role of a “third force”, was a weak player in the international arena and therefore minor, insignificant deviations from traditional policies of “containment and isolation” seemed acceptable. Moreover, the policy of “isolation” did not justify itself, as China has intensified its foreign policy, established relations with many countries, including the US allies. Gradually, the number of states that supported China’s demands for a seat in the UN grew, which created a real prospect for broad recognition of communist China. At the beginning of the presidency of J.F. Kennedy in January-October 1961, his administration was unable to quickly develop and begin to implement a holistic concept of “new frontiers” for China. His Chinese policy was inextricably linked to the US foreign policy in Asia and reflected the clash of American and Chinese interests in the region. At the same time, the representatives of the American establishment did not have a clear idea of how they could influence Soviet-Chinese relations in order to deepen the rift between the USSR and China, and what concrete benefits they could derive from this. This was due to a number of reasons. First of all, when he was elected, the administration of J.F. Kennedy joined the more important events at that time in terms of the US military and political interests than the policy towards China (European problems, issues of Atlantic unity, the Berlin crisis). Secondly, Washington still viewed communist China as a state that threatened American interests in Asia and was eager to expand its influence and strengthen its military power. An important influence on the formation of the foreign policy course of the administration J.F. Kennedy also had at the beginning of his presidency the fact that, having won the election with a minimal advantage, he did not risk starting a major change in Chinese policy and abandoning the policy of “containment”. In such way, the 35th President of the United States tried, at first, to show that he respected public opinion within the country, which was negative about communist China. Secondly, by demonstrating his propensity for the heredity of politics, he hoped to strengthen his vulnerable foreign policy position. That is why J.F. Kennedy, who did not rule out the possibility of changing China’s US policy, saw in his own practical actions toward China at the time no reason to abandon the doctrine of “containment”. Particularly, the idea of “containment” of China was the basis of a number of decisions of the John F. Kennedy administration, which eventually led to the escalation of American military intervention in Indochina.
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