信息披露、投资与监管

P. Östberg
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引用次数: 38

摘要

本文提供了一个分析自愿披露和强制披露的框架。由于信息披露的改善降低了企业家获取私人利益的能力,它为新投资提供了资金,但也为现有的股东提供了意外之财。因此,企业家可能会选择放弃投资,以获取更多的私人利益。强制性披露标准减少了低效率的提取,提高了投资效率。虽然最优标准高于企业家的最优选择,但为了不阻碍投资,它可能不完全。该模型还表明,更好的股东法律保护伴随着更高的披露标准,而披露标准的统一可能是有害的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Disclosure, Investment and Regulation
This paper provides a framework to analyze voluntary and mandatory disclosure. Since improved disclosure reduces the entrepreneur's ability to extract private benefits, it secures funding for new investments, but also provides existing claimholders with a windfall gain. As a result, the entrepreneur may choose to forgo investment in favor of extracting more private benefits. A mandatory disclosure standard reduces inefficient extraction and increases investment efficiency. Although the optimal standard is higher than the entrepreneur's optimal choice, it can be less than complete in order not to deter investment. The model also shows that better legal shareholder protection goes together with higher disclosure standards and that harmonization of disclosure standards may be detrimental.
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