{"title":"约束网络形成下的协调","authors":"Zhiwei Cui, Feihong Shi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3489510","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"e study whether maximum efficiency can be obtained in a stochastic learning model where players can actively form links with a limited number of peers to play a size-dependent minimum-effort game. The long-run equilibrium is contingent on the linking constraint and the marginal payoff from coordination. A restrictive linking constraint or a large marginal payoff from coordinating on the maximum effort promotes efficient coordination. Even if these conditions are not satisfied, players need not to be trapped in the least-efficient convention. With the discretion to choose partners, a large population of potential participants will facilitate the emergence of maximum efficiency.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Coordination with Constrained Network Formation\",\"authors\":\"Zhiwei Cui, Feihong Shi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3489510\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"e study whether maximum efficiency can be obtained in a stochastic learning model where players can actively form links with a limited number of peers to play a size-dependent minimum-effort game. The long-run equilibrium is contingent on the linking constraint and the marginal payoff from coordination. A restrictive linking constraint or a large marginal payoff from coordinating on the maximum effort promotes efficient coordination. Even if these conditions are not satisfied, players need not to be trapped in the least-efficient convention. With the discretion to choose partners, a large population of potential participants will facilitate the emergence of maximum efficiency.\",\"PeriodicalId\":393761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-11-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489510\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489510","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
e study whether maximum efficiency can be obtained in a stochastic learning model where players can actively form links with a limited number of peers to play a size-dependent minimum-effort game. The long-run equilibrium is contingent on the linking constraint and the marginal payoff from coordination. A restrictive linking constraint or a large marginal payoff from coordinating on the maximum effort promotes efficient coordination. Even if these conditions are not satisfied, players need not to be trapped in the least-efficient convention. With the discretion to choose partners, a large population of potential participants will facilitate the emergence of maximum efficiency.