{"title":"数学的准经验认识论","authors":"E. Shi","doi":"10.1515/krt-2021-0029","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper clarifies and discusses Imre Lakatos’ claim that mathematics is quasi-empirical in one of his less-discussed papers A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics. I argue that (1) Lakatos’ motivation for classifying mathematics as a quasi-empirical theory is epistemological; (2) what can be called the quasi-empirical epistemology of mathematics is not correct; (3) analysing where the quasi-empirical epistemology of mathematics goes wrong will bring to light reasons to endorse a pluralist view of mathematics.","PeriodicalId":107351,"journal":{"name":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Quasi-Empirical Epistemology of Mathematics\",\"authors\":\"E. Shi\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/krt-2021-0029\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper clarifies and discusses Imre Lakatos’ claim that mathematics is quasi-empirical in one of his less-discussed papers A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics. I argue that (1) Lakatos’ motivation for classifying mathematics as a quasi-empirical theory is epistemological; (2) what can be called the quasi-empirical epistemology of mathematics is not correct; (3) analysing where the quasi-empirical epistemology of mathematics goes wrong will bring to light reasons to endorse a pluralist view of mathematics.\",\"PeriodicalId\":107351,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0029\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0029","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper clarifies and discusses Imre Lakatos’ claim that mathematics is quasi-empirical in one of his less-discussed papers A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics. I argue that (1) Lakatos’ motivation for classifying mathematics as a quasi-empirical theory is epistemological; (2) what can be called the quasi-empirical epistemology of mathematics is not correct; (3) analysing where the quasi-empirical epistemology of mathematics goes wrong will bring to light reasons to endorse a pluralist view of mathematics.