欧洲无转基因标准的演变:消费者的推理和企业的战略采用

T. Venus, J. Wesseler
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引用次数: 4

摘要

在这篇文章中,我们讨论了消费者的推理和生产商和零售商的战略采用行为,关于欧洲的无转基因(GM-free)质量标准。我们认为,在对消费者需求的影响方面,强制性转基因标识制度与基于自愿过程的无转基因标识制度有三个主要原因:(1)尽管强制性和自愿性标识都表明含有转基因生物或用转基因生物生产的产品质量较低,但实验表明,强制性标识的信号效应更强;(2)一些消费者更关心直接食用转基因生物(即标记转基因生物)的影响,而不是只食用转基因生物衍生产品(即未标记的无转基因);(3)强制性标识将部分标识负担转移给转基因生产者,使转基因产品相对于自愿无转基因标识更加昂贵。我们讨论了生产商或零售商设定或实施自愿无转基因生产标准的原因。为了说明企业采用理论是如何扩展的,我们在双寡头环境下使用了一个实物期权博弈框架,并表明提供无转基因产品而不加标签是有益的。我们表明,如果没有标签的投资作为一种预投资或选择来扩展,以减少在需求增加的情况下实施标签的投资成本,则可能出现这种情况。最后,我们提供了一份影响欧洲无转基因市场发展的重要事件清单。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN GM-FREE STANDARDS: REASONING OF CONSUMERS AND STRATEGIC ADOPTION BY COMPANIES
In this article, we discuss reasoning of consumers and strategic adoption behavior of producers and retailers with respect to genetically modified-free (GM-free) quality standards in Europe. We argue that there are three major reasons why a mandatory GM labeling scheme differs from a voluntary process-based GM-free labeling scheme regarding the effect on consumer demand: (1) while both mandatory and voluntary labels signal that products containing, or produced with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are of lower quality, experiments show that the signaling effect is stronger in the case of mandatory labels; (2) some consumers care more about the effects of consuming GMOs directly (i.e., labeled GMO) compared to consuming only products derived from GMOs (i.e., non-labeled GM-free); and (3) mandatory labeling shifts some of the labeling burden to the GM producer making the GM product relatively more expensive compared to the case of voluntary GM-free labeling. We discuss reasons why producers or retailers set or implement a voluntary GM-free production standard. To illustrate how the firm adoption theory can be extended, we use a real option game framework in a duopolistic setting and show that it can be beneficial to offer a GM-free product without labeling it. We show that this can be the case if investing without labeling works as a pre-investment or option to extend to reduce the investment cost of implementing a label in the case of an increase in demand. Finally, we provide a list of important events that have affected the evolution of the GM-free market in Europe.
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