设计在线零售市场:利用赞助广告信息

Mark. Sci. Pub Date : 2021-11-05 DOI:10.1287/mksc.2021.1307
Fei Long, Kinshuk Jerath, M. Sarvary
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引用次数: 13

摘要

本文研究了一个信息不对称的市场设计问题,平台共同考虑利用广告拍卖中披露的信息并设定销售佣金,以最大化广告收入和销售佣金的共同利润。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Designing an Online Retail Marketplace: Leveraging Information from Sponsored Advertising
This paper studies a marketplace design problem with asymmetric information where the platform jointly considers leveraging information revealed in ad auctions and setting sales commissions to maximize the joint profit from ad revenues and sales commissions.
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