独立董事会的阴暗面,企业社会责任案例

Fangzhou Lu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

独立董事会已被证明对公司治理有积极影响,然而,我表明独立董事会以牺牲企业社会责任(CSR)为代价提高股东价值。具体来说,我发现,由于董事会的短视,员工和消费者等利益相关者的利益受到了损害。这一结果在产品市场竞争激烈的行业和拥有更多分析师的公司中更为明显。我的研究结果还表明,投资者可能没有完全消化负面的企业社会行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Dark side of Independent Boards, the Case of Corporate Social Responsibility
Independent boards have been documented to have a positive effect on corporate governance, however, I show that independent boards improve shareholder value at the cost of sacrificing corporate social responsibility (CSR). Specifically, I find that stakeholders such as employees and consumers' interest have been compromised as a result of board myopia. This result is even stronger among firms in industries with intense product market competition, and among firms with more analysts followed. My result also suggests that negative corporate social behavior may not be fully priced by investors.
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