信息不对称条件下货币联盟的潜在产出与财政规则

Luigi Marattin, Simone Meraglia
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了存在(i)成员国潜在产出信息不对称和(ii)成员国间纾困的货币联盟内的财政规则。最优赤字取决于周期,也就是成员国的产出缺口。在信息不对称和纾困存在的情况下,最佳赤字是无法实现的。纾困降低了成员国(贷款方)发出信号(歧视)的余地,并导致产出缺口较小的成员国过度借贷。货币联盟可以设计一种机制,使负产出缺口较小的成员国在从联盟获得转移支付后,拥有最优的预算赤字。我们表明,这种“周期性偶然”财政框架帕累托支配着目前由欧洲货币联盟执行的“周期性调整”财政规则。这样,我们的模型就可以解释这样一种情况,即周期性头寸的信息不对称和成员国之间的纾困都不会导致借贷扭曲。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Potential Output and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union Under Asymmetric Information
We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on member states’ potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle, that is, on member states’ output gap. In the presence of asymmetric information and bailout, the first-best deficit is not implementable. Bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states (lenders) and induces overborrowing by member states characterized by a low output gap. The Monetary Union can design a mechanism such that a member state with a smaller negative output gap runs an optimal budget deficit upon receiving a transfer form the Union. We show that, this ‘cyclically-contingent’ fiscal framework Pareto dominates the ‘cyclically-adjusted’ fiscal rule currently enforced by the European Monetary Union. Our model can then account for a situation where both asymmetric information over cyclical positions and the presence of bail-out among member states does not induce borrowing distortions.
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