溯因推理与无所不能的上帝:对但以理的回应

European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion Pub Date : 2017-12-19 DOI:10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.1827

Alex Yousif

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引用次数: 0

摘要

Daniel Came(2017)大胆地认为，在给定某些假设的情况下，原则上没有任何全能的存在可以成为某些偶然事件s的最佳解释。在本文中，我认为(I)即使给定Came的假设，他的论点也关键地建立在一个非推论上，(ii)他只是假设上帝存在的先验概率非常低，(iii)他的结论包含了很可能是错误的命题。

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Abductive Reasoning and an Omnipotent God: A Response to Daniel Came

Daniel Came (2017) boldly argues that given certain assumptions, no omnipotent being can even in principle be the best explanation for some contingent state of affairs S. In this paper, I argue that (i) even given Came’s assumptions, his argument rests crucially on a non sequitur, that (ii) he just assumes that the prior probability of God’s existence is very low, and that (iii) his conclusions entail propositions that are very probably false.

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European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion

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