{"title":"佔有证据","authors":"N. Ballantyne","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"For most controversial topics, there is far more evidence than we could ourselves possess. This chapter argues that when we learn of unpossessed evidence, we may gain two types of reasons indicating we have made an error. First, evidence of unpossessed evidence against our views can be evidence itself and, second, evidence of unpossessed evidence may prompt doubts that we have formed our controversial views on the basis of a fair or representative sample of the total evidence.","PeriodicalId":345622,"journal":{"name":"Knowing Our Limits","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Unpossessed Evidence\",\"authors\":\"N. Ballantyne\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"For most controversial topics, there is far more evidence than we could ourselves possess. This chapter argues that when we learn of unpossessed evidence, we may gain two types of reasons indicating we have made an error. First, evidence of unpossessed evidence against our views can be evidence itself and, second, evidence of unpossessed evidence may prompt doubts that we have formed our controversial views on the basis of a fair or representative sample of the total evidence.\",\"PeriodicalId\":345622,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Knowing Our Limits\",\"volume\":\"105 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Knowing Our Limits\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0007\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Knowing Our Limits","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
For most controversial topics, there is far more evidence than we could ourselves possess. This chapter argues that when we learn of unpossessed evidence, we may gain two types of reasons indicating we have made an error. First, evidence of unpossessed evidence against our views can be evidence itself and, second, evidence of unpossessed evidence may prompt doubts that we have formed our controversial views on the basis of a fair or representative sample of the total evidence.
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