从竞争到合作:造船委员会和国家造船安全计划，1926-1931

Planning and Profits Pub Date : 2018-06-01 DOI:10.5949/liverpool/9781786940667.003.0004

Christopher W. Miller

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摘要

这一章探讨了1926年之后军舰制造商和其他海军武器制造商缺乏订单和考文垂军械工厂倒闭后的反应。其中既有可预测的(多样化)，也有非法的(卡特尔和价格垄断)。海军部，特别是查特菲尔德，在允许这个卡特尔运作中所扮演的角色也被审查。

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From Competition to Collaboration: The Warshipbuilders’ Committee and the National Shipbuilders’ Security Scheme, 1926–1931

This chapter explores the responses to lack of orders that the warshipbuilders and other naval arms manufacturers undertook after 1926 and the collapse of the Coventry Ordnance Works. These ranged from the predictable (diversification) to the illegal (cartels and price fixing). The role the Admiralty, particularly Chatfield, played in allowing this cartel to operate is also examined.

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Planning and Profits

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