P. Malagón, Juan-Mariano de Goyeneche, Marina Zapater, Jose M. Moya
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[2010] Avoiding Side-Channel Attacks in Embedded Systems with Non-deterministic Branches
In this paper, we suggest handling security in embedded systems by introducing a small architectural change. We propose the use of a non-deterministic branch instruction to generate non-determinism in the execution of encryption algorithms. Non-determinism makes side-channel attacks much more difficult. The experimental results show at least three orders of magnitude improvement in resistance to statistical side-channel attacks for a custom AES implementation, while enhancing its performance at the same time.Compared with previous countermeasures, this architectural-level hiding countermeasure is trivial to integrate in current embedded processor designs, offers similar resistance to side-channel attacks, while maintaining similar power consumption to the unprotected processor.