[2010]基于非确定性分支的嵌入式系统侧信道攻击

P. Malagón, Juan-Mariano de Goyeneche, Marina Zapater, Jose M. Moya
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我们建议通过引入一个小的架构更改来处理嵌入式系统中的安全性。我们建议使用非确定性分支指令在加密算法的执行中产生非确定性。不确定性使得侧信道攻击更加困难。实验结果表明,自定义AES实现对统计侧信道攻击的抵抗能力至少提高了三个数量级,同时提高了其性能。与以前的对抗措施相比,这种架构级隐藏对抗措施易于集成到当前的嵌入式处理器设计中,具有类似的抗侧信道攻击能力,同时保持与未受保护的处理器相似的功耗。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
[2010] Avoiding Side-Channel Attacks in Embedded Systems with Non-deterministic Branches
In this paper, we suggest handling security in embedded systems by introducing a small architectural change. We propose the use of a non-deterministic branch instruction to generate non-determinism in the execution of encryption algorithms. Non-determinism makes side-channel attacks much more difficult. The experimental results show at least three orders of magnitude improvement in resistance to statistical side-channel attacks for a custom AES implementation, while enhancing its performance at the same time.Compared with previous countermeasures, this architectural-level hiding countermeasure is trivial to integrate in current embedded processor designs, offers similar resistance to side-channel attacks, while maintaining similar power consumption to the unprotected processor.
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